Coverage of financing deficit in firms in financial distress under the pecking order theory by Sanﬁlippo-Azofra, Sergio et al.
104 2016, XIX, 4
Finance
DOI: 10.15240/tul/001/2016-4-008
Introduction
Capital structure has been a frequent topic 
in fi nancial literature because it is one of the 
most important decisions a fi rm can make. 
Although many important contributions have 
been made in this area, most of the research 
does not include fi rms in fi nancial distress, so 
the fi nancing decisions adopted by these fi rms 
are still not well known. The fi nancing decisions 
of those fi rms are very important because most 
of the strategy decisions such as investments, 
market entry, or product diversifi cation 
are considerably affected by the fi nancial 
constraints faced by them (Bowe, Filatotchev, 
& Marshall, 2010).
Over the years, two main explanations for 
the capital structure of companies have been 
proposed (Barclay & Smith, 2005; Flannery 
& Rangan, 2006; Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Muradoğlu & Sivaprasad, 2012). The fi rst one 
is the static trade-off theory, which proposes 
a trade-off between the tax advantages of debt 
fi nancing and the costs of fi nancial distress. Too 
much debt can lead to fi nancial distress and too 
little debt can give rise to low returns on equity. 
Therefore, companies select the capital structure 
that maximizes their value, which leads to an 
optimal debt level. The second one is the pecking 
order theory, which postulates the existence 
of a hierarchy of fi nancial resources, so fi rms 
do not target optimum capital structures. When 
outside funds are necessary, fi rms can mainly 
resort to three sources: retained earnings, debt, 
and equity. Whereas retained earnings have no 
adverse selection problem, both equity and debt 
have an adverse selection risk premium because 
of information asymmetries between managers 
and investors. Investors demand higher returns 
on equity than on debt. Therefore, if companies 
do not have enough retained earnings to fi nance 
their investment project, they will prefer debt to 
equity.
Although these two theories have been 
tested using different methodologies, the 
evidence is controversial as the empirical 
results tend to support the predictions of both 
theories. Some studies highlight the importance 
of the pecking order theory and others show the 
relevance of the trade-off theory. In this regard, 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) fi nd strong 
support for the pecking order theory when 
they analyze the relationship between net debt 
issued and fi nancing defi cit. Fama and French 
(2002) and Leary and Roberts (2005) show 
that fi rms’ debt ratios adjust slowly or relatively 
infrequently toward their target, which is more 
consistent with the pecking order theory. Agca 
and Mozumdar (2004) and Lemmon and 
Zender (2010) propose a concave relationship 
between net debt issued and fi nancing defi cit, 
which enables a less strict fi nancial hierarchy 
of the pecking order theory. On the other hand, 
several authors fi nd evidence consistent with 
the trade-off theory (Cotei, Farhat, & Abugri, 
2011; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Frank 
& Goyal, 2009). Besides, some studies tend to 
bear out both theories. Frank & Goyal (2003) 
only fi nd support for the pecking order theory 
among large fi rms, and Leary and Roberts 
(2005) show that both theories help explain 
some aspects of fi nancing decisions. Finally, 
a lot of recent studies focus their attention on 
fi rms with different characteristics, such as 
small, large family controlled or diversifi ed fi rms 
(González & González, 2012; La Roccaa, La 
Roccaa, Geraceb, & Smark, 2009; Pindado 
& De la Torre, 2008; Selvarajah & Ursel, 2012).
Most previous studies have analyzed the 
capital structure of healthy fi rms. However, 
the results of these studies are not directly 
applicable to fi rms in fi nancial distress, mainly 
because these fi rms have overinvestment 
and underinvestment problems, less fi nancial 
sources available and are affected by bankruptcy 
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laws (Davydenko & Franks, 2008; López, Torre, 
& Sanfi lippo, 2012; Gian & Strahan, 2007). The 
little evidence about fi rms in fi nancial distress is 
controversial, because the studies do not fi nd 
support for the trade-off theory, but they do not 
provide conclusive results about the pecking 
order theory either. For example, Gilson (1997) 
fi nds that the high transaction costs borne by 
fi rms in fi nancial distress prevent them from 
adjusting their capital structure to optimum 
levels. In this regard, Pindado, Rodrigues and 
De la Torre (2006), when analyzing a sample of 
small and medium-sized Portuguese fi rms, fi nd 
that the fi nancing decisions of fi rms in distress 
do not depend on their previous debt levels or on 
the existence of target debt ratios, and therefore 
do not support the trade-off theory. Liang and 
Bathala (2009) perform a study on a small 
sample of fi rms in fi nancial distress in the United 
States, but their results are not very conclusive. 
They fi nd that the fi rms’ fi nancing decisions 
did not seek an optimum debt ratio. However, 
they also fi nd little support for the pecking order 
theory, as their results show a weak relationship 
between fi nancing defi cit and debt.
The trade-off theory proposes that fi rms 
pursue an optimal debt level by weighing the 
benefi ts of debt (especially debt-related tax 
shields) and the costs of debt (bankruptcy 
problems). However, many fi rms cannot quickly 
adjust their debt in response to changes in 
their target debt because they bear transaction 
costs. Firms in fi nancial distress have a lot of 
trouble reaching their optimal capital structure 
proposed by the trade-off theory because 
they have high transaction costs (Asquith, 
Gertner, & Scharfstein, 1994; Chou, Li, & Yin, 
2010). To reduce their debts, fi rms in fi nancial 
distress must negotiate new payment terms with 
creditors or sell assets that implies complicated 
adjustments. To this regard, Gilson (1997) fi nds 
that distressed fi rms hardly ever manage to 
reduce their debt level in order to reach their 
optimal capital structure, so their debt ratios 
continue to be high. Another argument against 
the trade-off theory in fi rms in fi nancial distress 
is that these fi rms cannot often take advantage 
of the debt-related tax shields. Financial 
distressed fi rms often incur losses, so they 
can seldom benefi t from the tax deductibility 
of interest (Barclay & Smith, 2005). Therefore, 
these fi rms fi nd it quite hard to strike a balance 
between the advantages and disadvantages of 
debt fi nancing.
The pecking order theory postulates the 
existence of a strict hierarchy of fi nancial 
resources because of information asymmetries 
between managers and investors (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999). 
Firms would start using internal funds, then 
debt, and fi nally equity. However, the imposition 
of this strict hierarchy might not necessarily 
be applicable in fi rms in fi nancial distress for 
two reasons: First, Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) suggest that these fi rms could cover 
their fi nancing defi cit by issuing equity or selling 
assets to avoid increasing their debt ratio and/or 
debt restructuring. Moreover, equity might be the 
only security that outside fi nanciers or investors 
are willing to buy; second, Chirinko and Singha 
(2000) show how a hierarchy of debt and 
equity is not necessarily followed strictly when 
fi rms face a restriction on their debt capacity, 
a common situation for fi rms experiencing 
diffi culties. All in all, fi rms in fi nancial distress 
frequently have to use all of their available 
fi nancial resources to cover their fi nancing 
defi cit and have more and more diffi culties to 
issue debt. This implies that fi rms in fi nancial 
distress increasingly turn to sources of funds 
other than debt issues as their fi nancing defi cit 
grows. Therefore, the relationship between net 
debt issued and fi nancing defi cit established 
by the pecking order theory cease to be linear 
and become concave quadratic. This quadratic 
relationship might well explain the controversy 
about the capital structure of fi rms in fi nancial 
distress.
The main contribution of this study is to 
test a potential concave quadratic relationship 
between net debt issued and fi nancing defi cit 
in fi rms in fi nancial distress, which has not 
been studied previously. If this quadratic 
relationship exists, the fi nancing decisions of 
fi rms in fi nancial distress will be different form 
the fi nancing decisions of healthy fi rms, so 
the formers will not follow the strict fi nancial 
hierarchy proposed by the pecking order theory 
due to their specifi c situation. Another important 
contribution of this study is that, different from 
previous research papers, we also analyze the 
probability of issuing equity. If fi rms in distress 
do not follow the strict hierarchy of the pecking 
order theory, a great probability of issuing equity 
can be expected than in healthy fi rms.
In this study we include healthy and 
distressed fi rms, so we are able to test the 
quadratic relationship in both sets of fi rms and 
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compare their different fi nancing behavior. Also, 
the methodology used allows us to overcome 
some limitations of previous studies. In the fi rst 
analysis, the System GMM methodology of 
panel data is used, which enables controlling 
for the model’s individual heterogeneity and the 
existence of potential problems of endogeneity. 
Subsequently, in the study of the probability of 
issuing equity, we use, for the fi rst time in this 
kind of studies, a new Heterogeneous Choice 
Models (HCM) methodology developed by 
Williams (2009) applied to a logistic function. 
This methodology allows us to avoid the bias 
caused by the differences in the degree of 
residual variation between healthy fi rms and 
fi rms in fi nancial distress. Previous studies 
do not consider those differences, so their 
results could be biased.
The analysis is performed on a sample of 
3,337 listed fi rms from Germany, Canada, the 
United States, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom from 1995 to 2006. The inclusion 
of these countries covers a broad spectrum 
of institutional environments. The sample 
period ends in 2006 to avoid the biases of the 
fi nancial crisis. The results indicate a quadratic 
relationship between fi nancing defi cit and net 
debt issued for fi rms in fi nancial distress. This 
relationship is concave, so that as the fi nancing 
defi cit increases, the net debt issuance 
proportion decreases. However, the fi nancing 
decisions of healthy fi rms follow a linear 
relationship rather than a quadratic one. Finally, 
the second analysis shows that fi rms in fi nancial 
distress have a greater probability of issuing 
equity, which supports our results regarding the 
existence of a concave quadratic relationship. 
Thus, equity fi nancing could be an alternative 
to debt issuance as a source of funds for fi rms 
in fi nancial distress.
The structure of the study is as follows: The 
sample used is described in Section 1. Section 2 
presents the model and main results in relation 
to the existence of a quadratic relationship. It 
also describes the analysis of the probability 
of issuing equity and displays the results. We 
fi nish with the conclusions and the references.
1. Sample and Data
To test the existence of the quadratic 
relationship, we use a sample of non-fi nancial 
fi rms listed on the stock exchange in Germany, 
Canada, the United States, France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom. The inclusion of these 
countries allows covering companies operating 
under different institutional environments with 
a broad spectrum of bankruptcy systems. This 
prevents that these circumstances condition 
the analysis by controlling for the country. For 
each country, we have an unbalanced panel of 
fi rms with information available for a minimum 
of seven consecutive years between 1995 
and 2006. To calculate the second-order serial 
correlation test, fundamental for guaranteeing 
the robustness of the estimations made via 
the System GMM methodology, data for each 
company of at least four consecutive years 
is required. In addition, to calculate certain 
variables in our analysis, we required variables 
lagged three years. We restrict the sample 
period to end in 2006 so that our results are not 
affected by the fi nancial crisis. After the onset of 
the fi nancial crisis, the fi rms’ fi nancing behavior 
could be conditioned more by the availability of 
funds in the economy and the disruption of the 
fi nancial systems than by the fi rms’ situation, 
which could have given rise to a bias in our 
results. The economic-fi nancial information for 
each fi rm is from the DataStream database, 
of the Thomson Financial Services group. The 
macroeconomic information is obtained from 
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database and OECD statistics. 
Tab. 1 shows the temporal and country 
distribution of the fi rms for the six countries 
included in the analysis. By including only 
listed companies, the number of fi rms traded 
on each of the securities exchanges conditions 
the size by country. However, the table shows 
that the sample size, for all years and countries 
analyzed, is adequate for performing the 
analysis.
Since the fi nancial distress situation is not 
directly observable, we employ two different 
proxy measures to distinguish the fi rms in 
fi nancial distress.
First, we use the Z-Score model (Altman, 
1968). The Z-Score model is:
Z = 1.2*X1 + 1.4*X2 + 3.3*X3 + 
+ 0.6*X4+1*X5 
(1)
where X1 is the working capital to total assets 
ratio; X2 is the retained earnings to total assets 
ratio; X3 is the earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets ratio; X4 is the market 
value equity to book value of total liabilities 
ratio; X5 is sales to total assets ratio.
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The value of Z-score has the following 
intervals. Values higher than 2.99 are considered 
the “safe zone”, and it means that the possibility 
of company’s bankruptcy is very low. Values 
between 1.81 and 2.99 are considered the 
“grey zone” or “zone of ignorance”, because of 
the susceptibility to error classifi cation. Values 
below 1.81 are considered “distress zone”, and 
it means that the possibility of a company’s 
bankruptcy is high. So, we identify fi rms in 
fi nancial distress when they are situated in the 
“distress zone”, when they have in a particular 
year a Z-score less than 1.81.
Second, we use the O-Score to classify 
fi rms in fi nancial distress (Ohlson, 1980). 
The O-Score is based on Ohlson’s predicted 
bankruptcy probabilities p, following this 
specifi cation:
 
(2)
yit = – 1.32 – 0.407 * SIZE + 6.03 * 
* TLTA – 1.43 * WCTA + 0.757 * 
* CLCA – 2.37 * NITA – 1.83 * 
FUTL + 0.285 * INTWO – 1.72 * 
OENEG – 0.521CHIN, 
(3)
where SIZE is the log of total assets to GNP 
Price-level index ratio; TLTA is the total 
liabilities to total assets ratio; WCTA is the 
working capital to total assets ratio; CLCA is 
Temporary distribution of the sample
Year Canada France Germany Italy United kingdom USA Total
1995 76 119 161 47 311 789 1,503
1996 89 129 176 54 324 953 1,725
1997 97 133 183 59 344 1,056 1,872
1998 108 142 191 65 364 1,164 2,034
1999 153 147 202 70 443 1,353 2,368
2000 170 143 197 76 475 1,541 2,602
2001 186 234 252 113 506 1,585 2,876
2002 208 250 258 129 534 1,611 2,990
2003 199 245 246 129 519 1,519 2,857
2004 191 241 237 128 505 1,463 2,765
2005 187 223 234 123 489 1,424 2,680
2006 169 189 215 112 453 1,231 2,369
Total 1,833 2,195 2,552 1,105 5,267 15,689 28,641
Observations per country
Country
Observations
Total Distressed Z-score Distressed O-score
Canada 1,833 516 122
France 2,195 436 149
Germany 2,552 568 246
Italy 1,105 429 80
United kingdom 5,267 643 425
USA 15,689 2,343 1,128
Total 28,641 4,935 2,150
Source: own
Tab. 1: Sample description
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the current liabilities to current assets ratio; 
NITA is the net income to total assets ratio; 
FUTL is the funds from operations to total 
liabilities ratio; INTWO is equal to one in net 
income is negative in the previous 2 years or 
zero otherwise; OENEG is equal to one if total 
liabilities are greater than total assets or zero 
otherwise;  where NIt is the 
net income for year t.
We identify fi rms in fi nancial distress when 
the bankruptcy probability is greater than or 
equal to 50%.
These two models have been widely used 
to identify fi rms in fi nancial diffi culties in both 
American and international studies (Dichev, 
1998; Griffi n & Lemmon, 2002; Bhagat, Moyen, 
& Suh, 2005; George & Hwang, 2010; Lopez 
et al., 2012). On average, fi rms in fi nancial 
distress represent 17% of the observations 
when we use the Z-Score model and 13% when 
we use the O-Score model.
2. Empirical Analysis
2.1 Methodology
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) present a test 
of the pecking order theory based on fi nancing 
defi cit under the premise that this defi cit is 
covered entirely by issuing new debt. Thus they 
propose the following relationship:
 (4)
where ΔDit is the amount of net debt issued or 
withdrawn; DEFit is the fi nancing defi cit; eit is the 
random error term. According to Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (1999), a simple version of the 
pecking order theory predicts α = 0 and βPO = 1.
This method of assessing the Pecking 
order theory has been widely criticized (Frank 
& Goyal, 2003; Leary & Roberts, 2010). In the 
case of fi rms in fi nancial distress, and according 
to Chirinko and Singha (2000), this model does 
not admit the possibility of simultaneously 
issuing debt and equity as we propose in this 
article. In this regard, Liang and Bathala (2009) 
fi nd that the βPO coeffi cient was positive and 
signifi cant, but considerably lower than 1 in 
fi rms in fi nancial distress. This result might well 
refl ect that fi rms in fi nancial distress cover their 
fi nancing defi cits not only with debt but with 
equity. In order to solve this problem, we will 
introduce the fi nancing defi cit square (DEF2) 
into the equation (4):
 (5)
The use of a quadratic term allows testing 
not only the simultaneous issue of debt and 
equity, but also the existence of a hierarchy 
different to that proposed by the pecking order 
theory (Lopez et al., 2012). If fi rms in distress 
depend less on debts (and more on equity), 
or use debt issues decreasingly to cover their 
fi nancing defi cit, when this fi nancing defi cit 
increases, the βPO coeffi cient in these fi rms 
would be positive, but considerably lower than 
1, and the ϒ coeffi cient would be negative. 
Thus the percentage of debt issued to fi nance 
the fi nancing defi cit would decrease as this 
fi nancing defi cit increased.
As our study simultaneously analyzed 
healthy fi rms and those in fi nancial diffi culty, we 
modifi ed equation (5) so that the model to be 
estimated would be as follows:
 (6)
where ΔDit is the net debt issued to total assets 
(Frank & Goyal, 2003; Lemmon & Zender, 2010; 
Liang & Bathala, 2009; Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 
1999); DEFit is the fi nancing defi cit divided by 
total assets. This variable includes dividend 
payments, net investment and changes in 
working capital, and is reduced by operating 
cash fl ows after interests and taxes; DIF is 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 for fi rms 
in distress and 0 for healthy fi rms. For this, as 
we showed earlier, we followed two alternative 
approaches: the Altman Z-Score (DIFZ) and 
the Ohlson O-Score (DIFO). εit represents the 
random error term. We also included dummy 
variables for country, year and sector. 
The β1 and ϒ1 coeffi cients, respectively, 
show the linear and quadratic effects for healthy 
fi rms. The (β1 + β2) coeffi cients show the linear 
effect for fi rms in fi nancial distress, and the (ϒ1 + 
ϒ2) coeffi cients show the quadratic relationship 
for fi rms in distress. To test the signifi cance 
of the (β1 + β2) and (ϒ1 + ϒ2) coeffi cients, it is 
necessary to perform a joint signifi cance test 
under the null hypotheses H0: β1 + β2 = 0 and 
H0: ϒ1 + ϒ2 = 0. If fi rms in fi nancial distress 
decreasingly used debt to cover their fi nancing 
defi cit as this fi nancing defi cit rises, (β1 + β2) 
can be expected to be positive and signifi cant, 
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but considerably less than 1, and (ϒ1 + ϒ2) can 
be negative and signifi cant.
To test the robustness of the analysis, we 
introduced the variables used by Frank and 
Goyal (2003) into the model (6), as proposed 
by Agca and Mozumdar (2004). This controls 
for other factors (apart from fi nancing defi cit) 
whose relevance has been demonstrated in 
previous studies of fi rm fi nancing decisions. 
The resulting model would be as follows:
 
(7)
where T refers to the tangibility of assets to total 
assets; MTB is the market-to-book ratio; LS is 
the natural logarithm of sales and P is the return 
on assets.
Tab. 2 presents summary statistics for the 
sample. We estimated the models (6) and (7) 
using the generalized method of moments 
(System GMM). This method allows controlling 
for potential problems of endogeneity through 
the use of instruments, by including the lagged 
right-hand side variables.
2.2 Results
Tab. 3 shows the results of the analyses. In 
model (a), the Altman Z-Score was used to 
identify the fi rms in fi nancial distress, while in 
model (b) the Ohlson O-Score was used.
In models (a) and (b), the quadratic term of 
the DEF variable was introduced. In the case of 
healthy fi rms, the DEF variable has a positive 
and signifi cant coeffi cient, but considerably 
less than 1. Therefore, the pecking order theory 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
ΔD 0.0137 0.1108 -0.9713 0.6989
DEF -0.0351 0.1761 -0.9877 2.4510
DIV 0.0138 0.0215 0.0000 0.2970
I 0.0691 0.0994 -0.9310 0.8892
ΔWK 0.0078 0.1287 -1.8135 1.3271
CA 0.1258 0.1646 -1.7118 1.1355
T 0.3226 0.2318 0.0002 0.9968
MTB 1.7125 1.2493 0.1845 19.1626
LS 12.6820 2.0845 2.8865 19.2228
P 0.0604 0.1237 -0.9779 0.6554
ΔT 0.0180 0.0957 -0.9566 0.8456
ΔMTB -0.0347 0.9701 -16.4099 14.4661
ΔLS 0.0904 0.3254 -4.8684 5.9904
ΔP -0.0009 0.0805 -0.9131 0.9371
LIQ 0.4898 0.2313 0.0032 0.9982
NDTS -0.0013 0.0337 -0.5281 0.6804
DEBT 0.5313 0.1983 0.0054 0.9984
LOGSIZE 5.5391 0.8878 2.8948 8.7543
Source: own
Note: ΔD is the net debt issued to total assets; DEF is the fi nancing defi cit divided by total assets; DIV is dividend pay-
ments to total assets; I is the net investment to total assets; CA refers to cash fl ow to total assets; ΔWK is the change in 
working capital to total assets; T refers to the tangibility of assets to total assets; MTB is the market-to-book ratio; LS is 
the natural logarithm of sales; P is the return on assets; LIQ refers to the current assets to total assets; NDTS is non-debt 
tax shields to total assets; DEBT is the leverage ratio; LOGSIZE is the logarithm of total assets.
Tab. 2: Sample statistics
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does not appear to have a higher explanatory 
power in the fi nancing decisions adopted by the 
healthy fi rms in our sample. The DEF2 variable 
is not signifi cant and therefore a quadratic 
model would not be suitable for these fi rms.
Regarding fi rms in fi nancial distress, model 
(a) shows that the joint signifi cance test (β1 + β2), 
under the null hypothesis H0: β1 + β2 = 0, is 
positive and signifi cant. The joint signifi cance 
test of the quadratic component (ϒ1 + ϒ2), 
under the null hypothesis H0: ϒ1 + ϒ2, is 
negative and signifi cant. Therefore, unlike in 
healthy fi rms, a concave quadratic relationship 
can be observed in fi rms in fi nancial distress. 
So, fi rms in fi nancial distress would use debt 
decreasingly as their fi nancing defi cit increases. 
In fact, the linear coeffi cient is considerably less 
1, so the fi rms in fi nancial distress in our sample 
did not strictly follow the pecking order theory. 
This coeffi cient, as we proposed, indicates that 
different fi nancial resources are used to cover 
the fi nancing defi cit. Model (b) shows the same 
(a) (b) (c) (d)
DEF 0.1662 **(2.48)
0.1641 **
(2.32)
0.0953 *
(1.83)
0.0613 *
(1.71)
DEF*DIFZ
0.2713 **
(2.36)
0.2995 ***
(4.46)
DEF *DIFO  
0.2353 ***
(2.73)
0.2142 ***
(3.63)
DEF2 -0.0927(-0.67)
-0.0413
(-0.28)
-0.0876
(-0.96)
0.0324
(0.49)
(DEF*DIFZ)
2 -0.1174(-0.95)
-0.1820 *
(-1.79)
(DEF *DIFO)
2 -0.2470(-1.47)
-0.2517 ***
(-2.66)
ΔT 0.4591 ***(6.24)
0.5002 ***
(8.94)
ΔMTB 0.0011(0.14)
-0.0053
(-1.37)
ΔLS 0.0225(1.18)
0.0053
(0.6)
ΔP -0.2113 ***(-3.6)
-0.0837 *
(-1.81)
CONS 0.0540(1.48)
-0.0057
(-0.25)
-0.0083
(-0.30)
-0.0024
(-0.31)
(β1 + β2) 0.4375 *** 0.3994 *** 0.3949 *** 0.2755 ***
(ϒ1 + ϒ2) -0.2101 *** -0.2883 *** -0.2696 *** -0.2192 ***
m2 0.951 0.452 0.171 0.12
HANSEN 74.26(0.179)
104.57
(0.194)
151.4
(0.131)
263.47
(0.212)
Source: own
Note: Coeffi cients associated with each variable. In brackets, T-student; *** indicates a level of signifi cance of 0.01, ** 
indicates a level of signifi cance of 0.05, * indicates a level of signifi cance of 0.1; m2 is the 2nd order serial correlation 
statistic. Hansen is the over-identifying restriction test (p-value in brackets). (β1 + β2) is the tests of joint signifi cance under 
the null hypotheses H0: β1 + β2 = 0. (ϒ1 + ϒ2) is the tests of joint signifi cance under the null hypotheses H0: ϒ1 + ϒ2 = 0. 
Time-dummy variables, country dummy variables and sector dummy variables are also included in the estimations al-
though the results are not shown in the tables to focus on the main results obtained.
Tab. 3: Results (DIF variable non-lagged)
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result, where the Ohlson O-Score was used to 
identify fi rms in distress. The test of the joint 
signifi cance (β1 + β2) is positive and signifi cant 
and (ϒ1 + ϒ2) is negative and signifi cant.
In models (c) and (d), the Frank and 
Goyal variables (Frank & Goyal, 2003) were 
introduced. In this case, the previous results 
were maintained since fi rms in fi nancial distress 
show a concave quadratic relationship, whilst 
in healthy fi rms only a linear effect is observed. 
For the control variables introduced, ΔT 
coeffi cient is positive and signifi cant, showing 
the usefulness of tangible assets as collateral 
to support greater level of leverage. As previous 
studies have shown greater profi tability has 
a negative effect on leverage (Frank & Goyal, 
2003; Mackay & Gordon, 2005).
To check the robustness of our results, 
the previous models were estimated again, 
introducing the DIF variable lagged one year. 
We used this to confi rm the effect of fi nancing 
defi cit on net debt issued one year after a fi rm 
experiences fi nancial distress. The results, 
not shown in this paper, are similar to those 
obtained in Tab. 3.
2.3 Analysis of Equity Financing
The results of the previous analysis show 
a concave quadratic relationship between 
net debt issued and fi nancing defi cit for fi rms 
in fi nancial distress due to the fact that this 
defi cit is covered by using different fi nancial 
resources. As we explained earlier, the main 
source available to these fi rms might well 
be equity fi nancing. If fi rms in distress do not 
follow the hierarchy of the pecking order theory, 
a great probability of issuing equity can be 
expected than in healthy fi rms. To test this idea, 
we propose a discrete choice analysis based on 
a logistic model in which the dependent variable 
takes value 1 if the fi rm issues equity and value 
0 otherwise. However, the inclusion of two 
groups of fi rms (healthy and distressed) makes 
it very probable that the homoscedasticity of 
random errors will not be fulfi lled because of the 
existence of differences in the degree of residual 
variation between both groups of fi rms. Unlike 
linear models, in non-linear models this fact 
gives rise to signifi cant biases in the estimation 
of the model parameters (Yatchew & Griliches, 
1985). To overcome this problem in the current 
study, we performed an analysis using the 
Heterogeneous Choice Models (HCM) applied 
to a logistic function. These models control for 
the differences in the random error variance 
between the groups, which allows avoiding the 
biases in the estimations (Williams, 2009). The 
proposed model is as follows:
 
(8)
where Λ (.) represents a logistic process; the 
dependent variable “y” takes value 1 if there is 
a net increase in external equity of at least 5% 
of total assets, otherwise value 0 (Hovakimian, 
Opler, & Titman, 2001; Leary & Roberts, 2010; 
Vanacker & Manigart, 2010); zi is a vector of 
variables used to determine the error variances 
linked to certain ϒ parameters. To select the 
control variables included in xi, previous studies 
on fi nancing and equity issuance was followed 
(De Haan & Hinloopen, 2003; De Jong & Veld, 
2001); DIF is a dummy variable that takes value 
1 for fi rms in fi nancial distress and 0 for healthy 
fi rms (as in previous analyses, the Altman Z-Score 
and Ohlson O-Score were used); P is the return 
on assets; LIQ refers to the current assets to total 
assets; DIV is dividend payments to total assets; 
NDTS is non-debt tax shields to total assets 
(Pindado et al., 2006); DEBT is the leverage ratio; 
LOGSIZE is the logarithm of total assets; PE is 
a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the fi rm 
has used equity fi nancing during the previous 
year and 0 otherwise. We also included dummy 
variable for country, year and sector. Summary 
statistics of the variables is showed in Tab. 2.
Tab. 4 shows the results of the analysis. 
Models (a) and (b), which include the variables 
without lags show that there is a greater 
probability of equity fi nancing in fi rms in 
fi nancial distress as the marginal effects of 
the DIFZ and DIFO variables are positive and 
signifi cant. These results support the existence 
of a concave relationship between the net 
debt issued and fi nancing defi cit obtained in 
the previous analysis. The absence of a strict 
fi nancial hierarchy implies the simultaneous use 
of different sources of fi nancing. This analysis 
demonstrates that equity fi nancing could be 
an alternative to debt issuance as a source of 
funds for fi rms in fi nancial distress as this would 
allow them to avoid excessive debt ratios or 
debt restructuring.
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With regard to the control variables, the 
results are similar to those of previous studies 
(De Haan & Hinloopen, 2003; Vanacker & 
Manigart, 2010). Profi tability, liquidity, the 
leverage ratio and prior equity fi nancing 
have a negative and signifi cant effect on the 
probability of issuing equity, whilst fi rm size and 
non-debt tax shields have a positive infl uence 
on this probability. Like previous studies, 
dividends do not affect the probability of equity 
fi nancing.
To check the robustness of our results, 
the previous models were estimated again, 
including all the variables lagged one period to 
avoid possible endogeneity problems (De Haan 
& Hinloopen, 2003). The results, not shown in 
this paper, are very similar to those obtained in 
Tab. 4, as fi rms in fi nancial distress continue 
showing a greater probability of issuing equity.
Conclusions
This study focused on analyzing the fi nancial 
decisions of fi rms in fi nancial distress. A strict 
hierarchy of fi nancing sources does not appear 
to be applicable in these fi rms. The study 
analyses the existence of a concave quadratic 
relationship between fi nancing defi cit and net 
debt issued, which provides additional evidence 
to previous research on the capital structure of 
fi rms experiencing fi nancial diffi culties.
The analysis was performed using a sample 
of 3,337 non-fi nancial fi rms listed on the stock 
exchanges in Germany, Canada, the United 
States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom 
during the period between 1995 and 2006. 
The estimates were based on System GMM 
methodology of panel data, which makes it 
possible to control for endogeneity problems, 
and on HCM models applied to a logistic 
function, which control for the existence of 
differences in the degree of residual variation 
between healthy and distressed fi rms.
We found evidence that neither the trade-
off nor the strict hierarchy suggested by the 
pecking order theory would be applicable in 
fi rms in fi nancial distress. Our results show that 
as fi nancing defi cit grows, these fi rms use debt 
decreasingly and have a greater probability 
of issuing equity. This leads to a concave 
quadratic relationship between fi nancing defi cit 
 (a) (b)
DIFZ 0.0405 (8.25) ***    
DIFO 0.0201 (3.29) ***
P -0.0483 (-7.09) *** -0.0597 (-7.66) ***
LIQ -0.0009 (-0.21) -0.0139 (-3.12) ***
DIV -0.0306 (-0.61) -0.0567 (-1.09)  
NDTS 0.0734 (3.14) *** 0.0854 (3.61) ***
DEBT -0.0511 (-9.43) *** -0.0381 (-7.15) ***
LOGSIZE -0.0049 (-3.93) *** -0.0042 (-3.23) ***
PE 0.0981 (13.78) *** 0.1017 (14.07) ***
  
Pseudo R2 0.2128  0.2181  
Source: own
Note: Marginal effects (incremental effects for dummy variables) associated with each variable. In brackets, T-statistic; 
*** indicates signifi cance at the 1% level, ** indicates signifi cance at the 5% level, * indicates signifi cance at the 10% 
level. Time-dummy variables, country dummy variables and sector dummy variables are also included in the estimations 
although the results are not shown in the tables to focus on the main results obtained.
Tab. 4: Marginal effects – HCM – logistic models
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and net debt issued. This means that the costs 
of bankruptcy outweighs the benefi ts of debt 
related tax shields, so these fi rms attempt to 
avoid excessively increasing in their leverage 
ratios. Equity issuance can be very benefi cial 
to fi rms in fi nancial distress because it delays 
high debt level and gives them time to carry 
out the necessary operational and fi nancial 
restructuring. Moreover, it can also alleviate 
the underinvestment behavior that arises 
from excessive debt levels and fi nancial 
distress. However, we must bear in mind that 
on many occasions, fi rms in fi nancial distress 
have no choice but to issue equity because 
equity might be the only security that outside 
fi nanciers or investors are willing to buy when 
the debt levels are very high. Our results also 
reveal the pecking order theory is not the main 
reason behind fi nancing decision in healthy 
fi rms. These fi rms seem to make their fi nancing 
decisions based on both trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory. On the one hand, these 
fi rms are more likely to pursue an optimal debt 
level as our results show that they only cover 
a small proportion of their fi nancing defi cit using 
debt. On the other hand, healthy fi rms have 
less likelihood of equity issuance than fi rms in 
fi nancial distress.
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Abstract
COVERAGE OF FINANCING DEFICIT IN FIRMS IN FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
UNDER THE PECKING ORDER THEORY
Sergio Sanfi lippo-Azofra, Carlos López-Gutiérrez, Begoña Torre-Olmo
The fi nancing decisions adopted by fi rms in fi nancial distress are very important because most of 
the strategy decisions such as investments, market entry, or product diversifi cation are considerably 
affected by the fi nancial constraints faced by them. However, these decisions are still not well 
known and empirical evidence about fi rms in fi nancial distress is controversial. Previous studies 
do not fi nd support for either the trade-off theory or the pecking order theory, which explain the 
fi nancial decisions of healthy fi rms. Distressed fi rms frequently have to use all of their available 
fi nancial resources to cover their fi nancing defi cit. This could give rise to a concave quadratic 
relationship between fi nancing defi cit and net debt issued, which might well explain the ambivalent 
results about the fi nancial decisions of these fi rms. To analyze this quadratic relationship, which 
has not been studied previously, we perform an empirical analysis on a sample of 3,337 listed fi rms 
from Germany, Canada, the United States, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Our results show 
that the pecking order theory does not appear to have a higher explanatory power in healthy fi rms. 
Moreover, the hierarchy suggested by the pecking order theory is not totally applicable in fi rms in 
fi nancial distress. Our results show that as fi nancing defi cit grows, these fi rms use debt decreasingly, 
which gives rise to a concave quadratic relationship between fi nancing defi cit and net debt issued. 
This suggests that fi rms in fi nancial distress have diffi culty issuing new debt. Our results also show 
that fi rms in fi nancial distress have a greater probability of issuing equity. Therefore, these fi rms can 
use equity fi nancing as an alternative to debt issuance.
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